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Describes a citation from another source. Generally, this information is displayed in a document with indentation, more than three lines and a different font size to highlight it in the document.
For the @content-type attribute the allowed values are:
- verbatim 
- dedication 
- epigraph 
- example 
- block-citation 
Examples:
Exemple of <disp-quote> for verbarim:¶
<disp-quote content-type="verbatim">
    <p>We suppose (i) that a priori judgement will play a part in the operation of any coherent system of belief, and (ii) that non-cognitivism about necessity had probably better grant a role for judgements of necessity as co-ordinate to (some) a priori judgements. If supposition (i) is wrong, then global Caution about necessitated judgements is, after all, at the service of the non-cognitivist about necessity</p>
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Exemple of <disp-quote> for epigraph:¶
<disp-quote content-type="epigraph">
    <p>La voie d’accès au présent a nécessairement la forme d’une archéologie.</p>
    <attrib>Giorgio Agamben, <italic>Qu’est-ce que le contemporain ?</italic></attrib>
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Exemple of <disp-quote> for dedication:¶
<disp-quote content-type="dedication">
    <p>En souvenir de Catherine Viollet</p>
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Exemple of <disp-quote> for example:¶
<disp-quote content-type="dedication">
    <p>En souvenir de Catherine Viollet</p>
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Exemple of <disp-quote> for block-citation:¶
<disp-quote content-type="dedication">
    <p>En souvenir de Catherine Viollet</p>
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Exemple of general <disp-quote>:¶
<p>In the face of the failure of the transmission argument Wright would, apparently, endorse the view that Caution could still provide an adequate route to an anti-realist account of necessity, as can be gathered from the following passage:</p>
<p>
    <disp-quote>
        <p>We suppose (i) that a priori judgement will play a part in the operation of any coherent system of belief, and (ii) that non-cognitivism about necessity had probably better grant a role for judgements of necessity as co-ordinate to (some) a priori judgements. If supposition (i) is wrong, then global Caution about necessitated judgements is, after all, at the service of the non-cognitivist about necessity</p>
    </disp-quote>
</p>
<p>I disagree. In the previous section we saw that showing that Caution is an incoherent attitude is not an easy matter.</p>